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We propose a methodology that facilitates a direct test of the homevoter hypothesis,
which posits that homeowner/voter support for a public good project is positively related to the
project’s expected effect on property values. First, we estimate how events that indicate an
increasing probability that the public good project will be undertaken impact local residential
property values before the referendum is held. These pre-vote impacts are considered noisy
signals to homeowners about the market’s assessment of the net marginal benefits of the project.
Second, we aggregate these market signals to the precinct level and relate them to precinct-level
voting results concerning the proposed project. We apply this method to the 2004 referendum in
Arlington, Texas, concerning a publicly subsidized stadium to host the NFL Dallas Cowboys.
The analysis supports the homevoter hypothesis and establishes a possible methodology for
future evaluations in this small but growing empirical literature.
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
Standard voting models assume voters show more support for public spending projects when the 
expected marginal consumption benefits exceed the marginal costs. When the net benefits of the 
project influences the value of voters’ asset holdings, the resulting wealth effect will be among 
the factors influencing voting behavior. The capitalization of local public goods into house prices 
has been well established in the economics literature.
1 Both the models of Wildasen [2] and 
Sonstelie and Portney [3] reveal that voters prefer the level of a public good that maximizes the 
value of their house. If the public good level is not optimal from a purely consumption 
perspective, the voter can sell the house and move.
2 Voter support of local public goods or 
services which preserve or enhance house values has been coined the “homevoter hypothesis” by 
Fischel [5].  
There are just two related empirical tests of the homevoter hypothesis. Brunner, Sonstelie 
and Thayer  [6] examine voter behavior in the State of California’s 1993 school voucher 
initiative. The initiative would have subsidized private elementary and secondary schools, and 
hence would have decreased the willingness to pay for housing in quality public school districts. 
Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer estimate the premium or discount associated with each of the 74 
school districts in Los Angeles County.  They establish a negative correlation between the 
premium paid for housing and support for the school choice initiative, which suggests that 
homeowners who felt their property values would be harmed by the school choice initiative 
voted against the proposal. In a follow-up paper, Brunner and Sonstelie [7] use survey data from 
potential voters regarding the State of California’s 2000 voucher initiative. Their finding that 
homeowners without school children but in good public school districts were less likely to vote 
                                                
1 Oates [1] is the first empirical work on the capitalization of the level of public spending. 
2 Bruckner and Joo [4] show that with imperfect mobility, consumption effects will enter into the voter’s calculus, 
although this is less so the earlier the voter expects to leave the community.   4 
for the initiative than if they lived in inferior school districts lends further support to the 
homevoter hypothesis.    
This paper provides the first direct empirical test of the homevoter hypothesis in the 
context of a large discrete project. We examine voting in a referendum for a new publicly 
subsidized stadium for the NFL’s Dallas Cowboys in Arlington, Texas. The public subsidization 
of sports stadiums is a controversial issue, and the debate over whether a subsidy is justified is 
often finalized at the ballot box. Stadium proponents highlight the quality of life improvements 
and economic activity generated by new sports venues, thereby justifying subsidies on the basis 
of public benefits. Carlino and Coulson [8], [9] contend that a stadium, or more specifically a 
franchise that plays in the stadium, can provide non-excludable public benefits such as civic 
pride and enjoyment from being a fan, for which residents may be willing to pay a premium. Tu 
[10] discusses jobs creation, increased local spending, and economic revitalization of depressed 
areas.  
However, Coates, Humphreys and Zimbalist [11] note that  referenda on stadium and 
arena subsidies have met with mixed results, suggesting that in some cases the majority of voters 
perceive the costs of publicly subsidized facilities to exceed the benefits.
3 Those critical of 
stadium subsidies counter that public benefits of new stadiums tend to be overstated ex ante, and 
that stadium subsidies  primarily  provide wealth transfers to wealthy team owners, wealthy 
players, and those fans who attend events in the new venue.  
In this paper, we empirically test whether differences in property values associated with 
the stadium proposal were also associated with differences in voters’ relative support for the 
proposal. On November 3, 2004, the citizens of Arlington, Texas, were given the opportunity to 
                                                
3 For example, Major League Baseball’s San Francisco Giants were denied a publicly built stadium by several Bay 
Area cities during the 1990s; the Giants eventually built a predominantly privately financed stadium on the 
waterfront in San Francisco proper.   5 
vote on a proposal to increase local sales and user taxes to contribute $325 million to the 
construction of a new, retractable roof stadium for the NFL’s Dallas Cowboys.
4  The proposal 
was announced in early August of 2004 and, following the model of other successful referendum 
campaigns, the subsequent three month campaign for the Cowboys stadium focused on the 
benefits of hosting the Cowboys and the expected positive impact of a new stadium on the future 
development of the city. These claims were somewhat distractedly rebutted by a small group of 
anti-subsidy activists who argued against the stadium proposal as it was tendered to the voters. 
The proposal to build a stadium for the Cowboys passed by a margin of 55 to 45 percentage 
points  
Our empirical strategy entails a two-step process. First, hedonic analysis of single-family 
residential property  prices  accommodates variations in  property  prices within the City of 
Arlington following two announcements that each increased the probability that a publicly 
subsidized stadium would be built in Arlington. Following the literature on local amenity effects, 
we employ a flexible distance specification that accommodates a non-monotonic but continuous 
house price surface.  This specification allows for house prices to be affected differently at 
different distances from the proposed stadium site. The second step follows the applied public 
choice literature by  relating precinct-level vote results to demographics and the estimated 
impacts of the two pre-vote announcements on local house prices. The research design allows us 
to test how expectations about the net benefits of a public good project, as reflected in the market 
prices for residential property, influence voter behavior. We do so by linking residential property 
values to an increasing  probability that the public good project will be undertaken. If 
homeowners anticipate that the proposed public good project is causing a decrease (increase) in 
                                                
4 In December 2006, approximately one year into construction, it was announced that the stadium will cost $1 
billion. The city’s contribution is ostensibly capped at $325 million.   6 
property values, homeowners should be more likely to vote against (for) the proposal. Our 
empirical findings reveal that the direction and the magnitude of the house price effects explain 
voter behavior in a manner consistent with the homevoter hypothesis. 
The paper expands on Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer [6] in several important dimensions. 
First, the capitalized house price effects from an uncertain future event proxy for the wealth 
effect homeowners would use in determining whether to support the proposed project. 
Explaining voting outcomes through this wealth effect is a direct test of the homevoter 
hypothesis. Second, because we have two announcement effects, each of which increases the 
likelihood that a referendum will pass, we  examine  whether price effects under reduced 
uncertainty are more important in explaining  voting outcomes. Finally, because both wealth 
effects and consumption effects vary with distance from the proposed stadium site, the spatial 
element plays prominently in the analysis. 
In the next section we provide some background on the Dallas Cowboys search for a host 
community and the events leading up to the eventual passage of the referendum in Arlington. We 
then  present the  house price  and voting analysis, respectively.  These are followed by some 
robustness checks. The paper concludes with a discussion of issues involved with voting on 
large, discrete municipal projects. 
 
2. Background 
In April 2001, the Dallas Cowboys announced they were interested in replacing Texas Stadium, 
which was built in 1972. Discussions concerning several preliminary proposals were tabled after 
the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City, and the Cowboys stadium search did not 
return to public light until late 2003. At this time, the City of Dallas proposed to replace the 
aging Cotton Bowl with a new retractable roof stadium, paid for with a countywide tax. This   7 
proposal was ultimately abandoned in spring 2004, in large part because the City of Dallas likely 
would have been exempt from the countywide tax increase. 
  On July 17, 2004, the mayor of Arlington announced that he had been in negotiations 
with the team about the potential of building a new stadium in Arlington. On August 17, 2004, 
the Arlington city council approved a ballot initiative to be decided during the November 3, 2004 
general election. The ballot initiative was comprised of two parts. First, that the city would 
provide up to $325 million in public dollars for land acquisition and construction costs for a new 
retractable roof football stadium for the Dallas Cowboys. The second allowed the city to increase 
the local sales tax by one half percent, increase car rental taxes by two percentage points and to 
increase the hotel occupancy tax by five percentage points; the proceeds from the tax increases 
would be used to retire the debt incurred for the city’s contribution to the stadium’s construction. 
On November 3, 2004, the voters of Arlington approved the ballot initiative 55% to 45%. The 
new stadium is scheduled to open for the 2009 NFL football season. 
During the stadium campaign, pro-stadium activists solicited an economic impact study, 
and produced television, radio, mass mailings, and newspaper advertising that touted the 
economic impact figures generated in their study.  Proponents claimed that the new stadium 
would increase local business revenue, create jobs, and spur redevelopment of surrounding areas. 
The Cowboys team was a major financial contributor to the campaign supporting the stadium 
subsidy. Players posted yard signs, and the famous team cheerleaders attended campaign events 
to encourage passage.  Ultimately stadium proponents out-spent anti-subsidy activists $6 million 
to $43,000. 
  The Cowboys stadium referendum in 2004 was only one of many that have been held 
throughout the United States since 1990. The dramatic increase in the number of new stadiums   8 
across the four major sports in the United States has been accompanied by a large and well-
established literature investigating the impacts of new stadiums on local economies, including a 
new stadium’s impact on local development (Campbell [12] and Nelson [13]), local employment 
and income levels (Baade and Dey [14] and Coates and Humphreys [15]) local tourism and hotel 
occupancy rates (Lavoi and Rodriguez [16]), and local tax revenue (Coates [17], and Depken and 
Coates [18]). In a different vein, several papers have investigated the impact of a new stadium on 
attendance (for example, Clapp and Hakes [19]), team winning percentage (Quinn et al. [20]), 
and the financial status of the franchise that plays in the stadium (Depken [21]). The empirical 
results consistently show that the impact of a new stadium on local economies is dramatically 
less than advertised before the stadium is constructed and in some instances might actually be 
negative.
5 
The literature investigating stadium referenda themselves is relatively sparse. Agostini, et 
al.  [23] were  the  first to estimate a vote-share model in the context of stadium referenda, 
focusing on 1989 and 1996 votes concerning public subsidization of a new stadium for the San 
Francisco Giants baseball team. In both votes, they find several demographic variables to be 
correlated with greater support for the stadium, including income, education, white-collar 
employment, and Asian heritage. Moreover, t hey find that the percentage of support for the 
stadium proposal increased by approximately 15% when the public subsidy was dramatically 
reduced in the 1996 proposal, which secured majority support. In an intra-city analysis, Depken 
[24] investigates how fan loyalty in professional baseball influences the outcome of stadium 
referendum outcomes in host cities using a probit analysis. He finds that teams with relatively 
stronger fan bases, i.e., greater fan loyalty, have a higher probability of securing public financing 
for a new stadium through the referendum process, but his analysis does not include many of the 
                                                
5 See Siegfried and Zimbalist [22] for a review of the literature concerning the impact of sports on local economies.   9 
demographics that are common to vote-share models. Coates and Humphreys [25] are closest in 
spirit to the study undertaken here and were the first to empirically investigate how proximity to 
a proposed stadium influences support for a stadium proposal. They investigate several votes in 
Green Bay, Wisconsin, and Houston, Texas, concerning renovating existing or building new 
stadiums. Their study suggests that proximity to the proposed stadium had a significant and 
positive impact on the relative support for a stadium proposal.  
While the existing literature focusing on the outcomes of stadium votes suggests that 
many elements contribute to the probability of success, one influence that has not been included 
is the anticipated impact of the new stadium on local residential property values, specifically, the 
homevoter hypothesis. To directly test this hypothesis, in the context of the Cowboys stadium 
search, w e first estimate the impact of the proposed stadium subsidy on property values in 
Arlington leading up to the stadium referendum, which coincided with the general election in 
2004. We then calculate the estimated dollar impact of the two pre-vote announcements on 
houses that sold in Arlington during the summer of 2004. We then aggregate estimated dollar 
impacts for  properties that sold during a time period into voting precincts to infer the average 
impact on all houses in that precinct. We then relate the support for the stadium referendum, 
reflected in percentage of votes in the affirmative, to precinct level demographics, the estimated 
price effects, and the distance of the precinct’s voting location relative to the proposed stadium 
site.  
 
3. House Price Model and Results 
Before the Cowboys stadium referendum two specific public announcements increased the 
probability that the stadium would be built in Arlington. We assume that homeowners observe   10 
signals from residential property transactions in their immediate neighborhood from which they 
can estimate the anticipated net effect of the proposed stadium  on the market value of their 
house. If the market responds to the proposed public good project with an increase (decrease) in 
the price of residential property, everything else equal, the proposed public good can be viewed 
as contributing a net benefit (cost) to the local population. While homeowners do not receive 
direct signals about the value of their own home unless they put it on the market, they do observe 
transaction prices of properties in their immediate neighborhood. From these transaction prices, 
homeowners extract a (noisy) signal about whether the market as a whole expects the proposed 
project to convey net benefits.  
The first stage of our empirical approach is an extension of Dehring, Depken, and Ward 
[26] in which five specific announcements concerning the broader search for a stadium site for 
the Dallas Cowboys in 2004 is investigated. Their inter-city analysis utilizes a differences-in-
differences identification scheme within a hedonic pricing model to estimate the average house 
price effect within Arlington relative to surrounding cities. The announcement dates used in this 
study that pertain to Arlington are presented in Table 1. Moreover, as we include only the city of 
Arlington in the empirical analysis, a difference-in-difference approach is not necessary.  
The hedonic model of stadium amenity effects developed here features a piecewise linear 
distance function. This specification accommodates a non-monotonic but continuous house price 
surface as a function of the distance from the proposed stadium site.  Since our dependent 
variable is the logarithm of price, we implicitly assume that the amenity effect is proportional to 
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where CHAR is a vector of  housing  characteristics and  G is a vector of parameter values. 
Housing characteristic include lot size in acres, square feet of living space, number of baths, age 
of house in years, number of parking spaces, number of stories, and whether there is a pool on 
the property. The model also includes variables indicating whether the house is owner occupied, 
or was vacant at the time of sale, respectively.  The percent of elementary students rated 
acceptable and commendable on the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) test, 
respectively, at the public elementary school associated with the property are included in the 
model. These two variables are used to control for the quality of the elementary school to which 
any appropriately-aged children living in the house could attend.
6 The model also includes a set 
of dummy variables which indicate the month in which the sale was negotiated assuming 30 days 
from date of negotiation to closing.  
Our distance specification identifies price effects attributable to the proposed stadium. 
Moreover, the flexible functional form allows the percentage change in price per mile to differ 
near the proposed stadium site and across announcements. The variable DSTAD is the great-
circle distance from the property to the proposed stadium site measured in miles. The maximum 
distance between a property in our sample and the proposed stadium site is 12 miles, therefore 12 
                                                
6 The analysis in Dehring, Depken and Ward [26] includes more home sales over a greater area which allowed for 
fixed effects for elementary schools to control for school quality.   12 
– DSTAD is the distance from the housing unit to the periphery of a circle having a 12 mile 
radius and the stadium as its mid-point. Thus b0 indicates the percentage change in price from 
being an addition mile closer to the stadium during the pre-referendum announcements;  b0 
reveals the effect of additional proximity to the stadium, rather than distance from the stadium. 
Likewise, b1 and b2 measure the marginal effect of additional proximity after the first and second 
announcements.  A positive coefficient suggests that properties closer to the stadium carry a 
premium relative to properties with similar characteristics further from the stadium. Ostensibly 
the premium indicates that the benefits of being near the stadium, including but not necessarily 
limited to proximity to the events in the stadium, proximity to any expected development around 
the stadium, and potential revenues from parking and other concessions, dominate the costs of 
being near the stadium, including but not limited to crowding, noise, or additional crime. A 
negative parameter coefficient would suggest the costs of being nearer the stadium outweigh the 
benefits of being nearer the stadium. 
Following Tu [10] we allow for different effects associated with distance for the first 
three miles from the stadium.
7 The variables D1, D2, and D3 indicate whether the property is 
within 1, 2, or 3 miles of the proposed stadium site, respectively.  The piecewise linear distance 
function is therefore kinked at 1, 2 and 3 miles from the stadium site. The coefficients b3, b6, and 
b9 reflect the additional percentage change per mile from being within 3, 2 and 1 mile of the 
stadium during the pre-referendum announcements, respectively. Together these coefficients 
reveal whether the stadium is placed in a local value “crater” or value “peak” on the larger 
Arlington price surface.  
                                                
7 While we test for price effects beyond 3 miles, none of these are significant, consistent with Tu.   13 
The price effects of interest concern the stadium announcements. The announcement 
variables, ANNj, j = 1, 2, 3 correspond to Announcement 1, 2 and 3 listed in Table 1.
8 These 
variables indicate whether the property sale was negotiated following the relevant stadium 
announcement, assuming 30 days to closing. Thus, the remaining coefficients in the model reveal 
whether an announcement contributed any additional percentage change in price per unit of 
distance within a given distance from the proposed stadium site. Any citywide price effects from 
stadium announcements  1, 2 or 3  would be indicated by  the  significance o f  b1,  b2, or  b3, 
respectively.
9 The remaining 9 coefficients reveal the additional percentage change in price per 
mile closer to the stadium within 1, 2, or 3 miles from the stadium, respectively, following 
announcement 1, 2, or 3, respectively.  
The data for the hedonic price model, which include sale price, date of sale, and housing 
characteristics, were obtained from the Dallas-Fort Worth Multiple Listing Service. Elementary 
school TAKS (Texas Assessment of Knowledge Skills) results are obtained from the T exas 
Education Agency, and distance variables are generated by geo-coding each residential 
property’s address to latitude-longitude coordinates and calculating the great circle distance from 
the property to various points of interest. The original sample size of properties sold in Arlington 
was 4,147 for the 2004 calendar year. However, missing and obviously incorrect values (e.g., 
`year built’ being coded as 1800, long before the city of Arlington existed), reduces the working 
sample to approximately 4,000 observations. Approximately 700 properties cannot be accurately 
matched with information about schools’ TAKS scores. Finally, MLS data was merged with 
                                                
8 While we allow for prices to differ before and after the actual vote, only changes related to the first two 
announcements are relevant to the subsequent voting analysis. 
9 The additional percentage change in price per mile of distance closer to the stadium for a property within 1 mile of 
the stadium following announcement 1 is b1 + b4 + b7 + b10. The total percentage change in price per mile of 
distance closer to the stadium for a property within 1 mile of the stadium following announcement 1 is b0 + b1 + b3 
+ b4 + b6 + b7 + b9 + b10.   14 
parcel data from the Tarrant County Assessor’s Office so that condominium sales are eliminated 
from the sample. Information on lot size was also obtained from this County data. Ultimately, the 
sample employed in this stage of the analysis is comprised of 2,241 single family detached 
houses that sold between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2004.  The sample  characteristics 
are reported in Table 2.  
To estimate the hedonic pricing model we apply a logarithmic transformation to the sale 
price. Regression results are presented in Table 3. The parameter estimates on property 
characteristics are as expected.
10 Turning to the results relating to distance from the proposed 
stadium site, before the initial announcement there was a small premium related to proximity to 
the stadium beyond  2 miles of the proposed stadium site. In the neighborhood around the 
proposed stadium site, however, the results suggest that the proposed location was in the center 
of a value crater on the broader price surface of Arlington. The results reveal an additional 
percentage decrease of 9% per mile closer to the stadium within 2 miles of the stadium, and 
another additional decline of 14% per mile closer to the stadium within one mile of the stadium. 
This confirms our expectations that the proposed stadium site was in a local value depression.
11 
  House price effects from announcements 2 and 3 are significant within 3 miles of the 
proposed stadium site, but not beyond 3 miles.  These are graphically depicted in Figure 1. 
Following announcement 2, house prices decrease by 8.5% per mile with each mile closer to the 
stadium for houses within three miles of the stadium. Following the stadium vote, denoted 
Announcement 3, this price effect effectively reverses between 1 and 3 miles from the stadium. 
                                                
10 House prices decrease with each additional year of age. Each additional square foot of living space contributes 
0.03% to house price. Having a pool increases house price by 10%, while, each additional bath adds 6%. A parking 
space contributes 3% to price, while each additional story reduces price by 6% (controlling for house size). House 
prices are 0.66% higher with each additional percent of elementary students rated commendable on the TAKS test in 
the property’s elementary school district. Finally, the lot area elasticity of value is 0.16, suggesting that prices 
increase with acreage but at a decreasing rate. 
11 We ignore the coefficients on the distance variables that are not significant for the purposes of this discussion.    15 
However, with within 1 mile of the stadium, house prices again decrease with proximity to the 
stadium. Specifically, following announcement 3, there is an additional decrease in house prices 
of 42% per mile with each mile closer to the stadium for houses within one mile of the stadium. 
The cumulative loss in value for properties on the edge of the stadium is 15.4% before the vote, 
and 37% over the sample period.  Overall, the results of the house price analysis reveal no access 
related net benefits from the stadium for the majority of property owners in the city of Arlington, 
but substantial costs to those in close proximity to the stadium.
12 
 
4. Vote Model and Results 
In the second phase of the empirical analysis, we investigate whether the perceived costs and 
benefits of the referendum, as capitalized into house prices, affected voting behavior on the 
referendum. Specifically, we relate the percentage of ‘YES’ votes in a particular voting precinct 
to demographic characteristics of the population in that precinct and the average estimated effect 
of the various announcements concerning the stadium proposal on house prices in that precinct. 
Of particular interest is whether the average effects on housing prices in a precinct can explain 
variation in voting outcomes. The homevoter hypothesis predicts a direct relationship between 
price effects attributable to the proposed public good project and support for the projects at the 
voting booth, i.e., homevoters will offer more support for public good projects that provide a 
greater net increase the value of their property.  
                                                
12 It is important to note that the intra-city analysis does not reveal the total costs or benefits from the stadium 
announcement. This is because any costs or benefits borne equally by all Arlington residents are not testable in this 
framework. The intercity analysis of Dehring, Depken, and Ward [26] suggests that there was an average reduction 
in property values in Arlington of about 1.5% relative to the surrounding markets that would not bear any tax burden 
for the new stadium. A non-proportional sales tax effect, borne by Arlington residents and those who shop in the city 
of Arlington, may explain this discrepancy.  
   16 
We generate the estimated dollar impact of Announcements 1 and 2 on the sales price of 
each property in our sample using the results from the hedonic regression model discussed 
above.
13 Variation in the impact of the announcements is identified through distance from the 
proposed stadium site and the interaction of distance with the various announcement periods.  
We derive a dollar estimate of how much the stadium proposal cost homeowners during the two 
announcement periods in the summer of 2004. We utilize this information in a voting model 
similar to that in Brunner, Sonstelie, and Thayer [6].   

























      (2) 
where the dependent variable is the percentage of total votes cast in favor of the stadium 
proposal in precinct i, the q’s and a’s are parameters to be estimated, and w is a zero-mean 
stochastic error term.  
We include the percentage of a precinct’s population that was in another state in 1995 for 
two reasons, both of which suggest greater support for the stadium. An individual living in 
another state in 1995 was less likely to have participated in the 1991 referendum in Arlington to 
build a stadium for the Texas Rangers baseball club. Although the promised economic 
development around the stadium had not materialized by the time the Cowboys proposal was 
being considered, the memory of such promises would be strongest for those who were living in 
Arlington at the time of the baseball stadium referendum. Moreover, a district with a greater 
                                                
13 We use both significant and insignificant coefficients when calculating the estimated dollar impacts.   17 
proportion of the population in another state in 1995 might have a more transient population in 
general, perhaps comprised of people who might not expect to be living in Arlington for the 
entire life of the proposed stadium, thereby reducing their expected tax contribution to the 
stadium. If this is the case, we would expect to see a greater level of support for the stadium 
proposal.  We also include the percentage of the precinct’s population over the age of 65, 
although the expected effect of an older population on stadium support is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, older residents are often on fixed incomes and are somewhat reluctant to vote for tax 
increases, but in this case those over 65 might have a lower expected contribution to the stadium. 
The net effect of these influences is not clear.  
Depken [27] estimated that (league-wide) professional football is a normal good. If this is 
also the case in Arlington, those with greater income are expected to attend football games in 
greater numbers and, relative to those who do not attend games in the new stadium, stand to earn 
more consumer surplus from the new football stadium if the proposal were to pass. Although 
those with more income might bear a greater tax burden, we expect that, on net, support for the 
stadium will be higher in precincts with w ealthier populations.  Similarly areas with more 
unemployed individuals are less likely to anticipate large consumer surplus from a new stadium 
and are simultaneously more reluctant to vote for increases in potentially regressive sales taxes. 
Therefore the greater the unemployment we expect less support for the stadium. The impact of 
racial composition on stadium support is ambiguous.  
The primary variables of interest in this model are the distance of the precinct from the 
proposed stadium site, the percentage of a precinct’s population that were homeowners, and the 
estimated impacts of the various stadium announcements on residential property values. The 
further away from the proposed stadium site, the lower the net benefits of the stadium. Therefore,   18 
we anticipate in general that the further the voting precinct is from the proposed stadium site, the 
lower the support for the stadium. 
The homevoter hypothesis posits that homeowners are reluctant to vote for policies that 
reduce their property values. In the case of the Cowboys stadium referendum, Dehring, Depken, 
and Ward [26] estimate that property values were falling in Arlington relative to surrounding 
markets. Therefore, we anticipate that precincts with a greater proportion of homeowners will 
have less support for the proposed Cowboys stadium, ceteris paribus.   
The remaining variables measure the potential information that homeowners might have 
received about the influence on local property values of the various announcements concerning 
the stadium vote. For each property we estimate the impact of distance from the proposed 
stadium on actual house sales and differentiate across different announcement periods. For each 
precinct, we then calculate the average effect of the proposed stadium on those houses that sold 
during a particular announcement period; these variables are denoted  DOLLARANN1 and 
DOLLARANN2, respectively.  
Not all precincts in the city of Arlington had a house sell during a given announcement 
period. To accommodate this we create two dummy variables that take a value of one if there 
were no house sales during a given announcement period, denoted NOSALES1 and NOSALES2, 
respectively. For those precincts with no house sales, the dollar effects are coded as zero and the 
dummy variables differentiate between a price effect that equals zero and the absence of a price 
effect.  
We anticipate that if individuals receive negative (positive) signals about the impact of 
the proposed stadium on properties within their precinct then support for the stadium proposal 
will be lower (greater),  ceteris paribus.  Therefore, i f the behavior of Arlington voters is   19 
consistent with the homevoter hypothesis, we anticipate a positive coefficient on the estimated 
price effect. If homeowners receive no information about the impact of the stadium proposal on 
local property values, that is one or both of the NOSALES dummy variables takes a value of one, 
the impact on support for the proposal is ambiguous.  
The total number of votes cast concerning the stadium proposal and the total votes in the 
affirmative were obtained for each of 118 voting precincts in the city of Arlington from the 
Tarrant County election commission.
14 Election totals were available for early voting, which 
took place from October 1 through October 29, 2004, and voting that took place on the day of the 
general election, November 3, 2004. In this analysis, we combine early and day-of-election votes 
to generate the total number of votes from which we determine the percentage of affirmative 
votes in a precinct voting. We matched 113 of the 123 voting precincts in Arlington with U.S. 
census block data from the 2000 census, from which we obtained the population characteristics, 
income, unemployment, the percent white, and the percentage  of residents  that were home 
owners. Distance is calculated as the great circle distance from the proposed stadium site to the 
polling location of each precinct.  
Descriptive statistics of the 113 voting precincts in the city of Arlington employed in our 
regression model are reported in Table 5. Average support for the stadium proposal throughout 
all of Arlington was 56.7 percent. However, there was considerable variation across precincts. 
Twelve precincts offered less than 50 percent support for the stadium proposal; the least amount 
of support (43.4 percent) was in Precinct 2451, located approximately 3 miles from the proposed 
stadium site. Ten percent of the average precinct’s population was in another state in 1995, 
approximately 6.75 percent of the population was older than 65, median household income was 
                                                
14 The precincts not included in our final sample include two that were technically located in Kennendale, a border 
city with Arlington. The remaining precincts did not report any voting activity during the general election of 2004.    20 
approximately $55,000, the unemployment rate averaged three percent, the average precinct was 
64% white, the average precinct was 7.5 miles from the proposed stadium location, and 61 
percent of the population owned their house.  
We use standard ordinary least squares regression methods to estimate the voting model 
in a cross-sectional framework. The results of several different specifications are reported in 
Table 5. Model 1 serves as a benchmark case; it does not include any of the variables concerning 
property values or property sales. The percentage of the population in another state in 1995 and 
income are both positively correlated with support for the stadium. The remaining variables are 
consistently insignificant.  
Model 2 in  Table 5 introduces the variables  DOLLARANN1  and  NOSALES1.  The 
parameter estimates on the original set of variables do not change in magnitude and nor 
significance. The parameter on DOLLARANN1 is positive, but not statistically different from 
zero at the usual confidence levels, and the parameter on NOSALES1 is positive and statistically 
significant.  The lack of significance of  DOLLARANN1  is  not surprising given that  this 
information would have been obtained up to six months prior to the actual vote.  
Model 3 includes only  DOLLARANN2  and  NOSALES2. The coefficient on 
DOLLARANN2 is positive and statistically significant. Precincts in which property values were 
increasing during the Announcement 2 period offered more support for the stadium. Specifically, 
there is a 1.2% increase (decrease) in support for the stadium for every $1000 dollar increase 
(decrease) in house prices.  Moreover, in precincts without any home sales during the 
Announcement 2 period, support for the stadium was approximately 7 percentage points greater. 
In this model, support for the stadium declined as the precinct was further from the proposed 
stadium site which might reflect lower expected benefits from amenities local to the stadium.    21 
Model 4 includes DOLLARANN1, NOSALES1, DOLLARANN2, and NOSALES2. In this 
model  the variables associated with the  first  announcement period are insignificant whereas 
those associated with the second announcement period are significant. The evidence suggests 
that the impact of the stadium proposal on housing prices was more important (in a statistical and 
economic sense) during the second announcement period, closer to when the vote took place, 
than during the first announcement period, which occurred months ahead of the vote during the 
early part of the summer of 2004. 
Models 5-7 repeat the estimation dropping the distance variable; there is some concern 
that the correlation between the distance from the proposed stadium site and the percentage of a 
precinct that are homeowners is sufficiently high to induce noise in the standard errors of the 
remaining parameter estimates.  In Models 5-7 the results do not qualitatively change, however 
the percentage of the precinct’s population that owned their own home is now negative and 
statistically significant. Combining the negative parameter estimates on home ownership with the 
positive parameter estimates on the average dollar effect of the first and second announcements 
and the positive parameter estimates on the dummy variables that indicate no house sales in a 
precinct suggests two things. First, property owners did not anticipate as high net benefits as 
non-property owners, perhaps because they feared a greater share of the tax burden or they 
considered themselves less mobile and therefore unable to leave the tax jurisdiction. Second, as 
houses sold for higher (reduced) prices in a particular precinct, support for the stadium proposal 
increased (fell).  
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5. Robustness Checks 
There might be concern that the results presented in Table 5 are driven by the level of turnout for 
the election rather than the impact of the announcements on property values. While the stadium 
proposal was coincident with the presidential election of 2004, it is possible that turnout was the 
variable which responded to the signals provided by the residential property market. Therefore, 
we test whether the results reported in Table 5 are confirmed when voter turnout is the dependent 
variable rather than percentage voting in favor of the stadium proposal. 
  We obtained information on the number of registered voters for 94 of the 113 precincts in 
our sample. Knowing the total number of votes cast in each precinct facilitates calculating the 
percentage of registered voters who participated in the stadium vote. We re-estimated the models 
in Table 5 replacing percent support with percent turnout. The results are reported in Table 6. 
  Turnout was statistically higher in precincts with older populations, more wealthy 
populations and where there were more whites. A larger decline in house value is associated with 
larger turnout but these effects are never statistically significant. The only variables concerning 
property values significantly related to voter turnout are the dummy variables NOSALES1 and 
NOSALES2, which have negative parameter estimates. This suggests that turnout was higher 
when there was more information about the impact of the stadium proposal announcements on 
local property values. Even though the November 2004 election was a general election, 
information about home sales that would have an impact only on this referendum still had an 
impact on turnout. Combined with the results from Table 5, this is consistent with information 
about property value declines both increasing voter  turnout  and diminishing support for the 
stadium proposal, ceteris paribus.    23 
  Another robustness check is to investigate whether the estimated price effects associated 
with announcements during the summer 2004 are spuriously related to the outcomes of previous 
votes in Arlington concerning tax increases for public projects. I n several different special 
elections the citizens of Arlington failed to approve projects that would have increased local 
sales taxes but would have had limited or targeted public benefits. There is no reason to believe 
that the net benefits from these elections would be distributed similarly to those from the stadium 
referendum. These additional votes provide a convenient way to test whether the results from the 
2004 stadium vote are merely correlated with some omitted variable measuring voter sentiments. 
We obtained vote results for three specific public-good proposals in Arlington during the 
period immediately before the Cowboys stadium proposal and for the mayoral race preceding the 
stadium referendum. All three of the proposals we investigate here dealt with transportation 
issues. In May 2002 and February 2003 Arlington voters rejected proposed increases in the city’s 
sales tax to fund mass transit systems.
15 In November 2003, Arlington supported a one-quarter 
cent increase in the local sales tax to fund a city-wide street maintenance program. We denote 
these as TransitTax1-TransitTax3. .  
We also obtained vote totals for the May 2003 Arlington Mayoral election, which Robert 
Cluck won. Mayor Cluck spearheaded the initial negotiation with the Cowboys and was arguably 
instrumental in  crafting the stadium  proposal  and securing sufficient  public support for the 
proposal to pass.
16 While the issues concerning the proposed stadium were not a part of the 2003 
mayoral race, they may have been anticipated by voters. Therefore, it might be the case that 
those precincts which would be affected by a stadium proposal would show different support for 
Robert Cluck as mayoral candidate. 
                                                
15 As of June 2007, Arlington was the largest city in the United States without its own mass transit system. 
16 In May 2007, Robert Cluck won re-election as Mayor of Arlington, garnering 65% of the votes cast (City of 
Arlington, City Secretary’s Office, 2007).   24 
  The data for these votes were gathered from 24 special polling locations, all of which are 
normal polling locations during general elections. Individual precinct data were unavailable, as a 
single polling location typically served multiple precincts, and matching data from a special 
election to precinct level data is somewhat difficult. We therefore relate the voting behavior for a 
particular special polling location with the precinct in which it is located.  The descriptive 
statistics for these four additional elections are reported at the bottom of Table 4. 
  We re-estimate the models using percentage voting in support of the other proposals 
(Models 1-6) and the election of Mayor Robert Cluck (Models 7 and 8). Our expectation is that 
none of the variables describing the effect of stadium proposal announcements from 2004 would 
influence the support for tax proposals in 2002 or 2003 or the Mayoral race in 2003. In other 
words, we do not expect our estimated price effects to be statistically relevant to explaining the 
variance in voter support for pre-2004 proposals. 
  The results of these robustness checks are reported in Table 7a and Table 7b. In Table 7a 
we estimate two models for each of the alternative votes analyzed. The abbreviated model 
necessitated by fewer observations includes the majority of the demographic variables included 
in the previous models (the results were not altered by including all the variables), whereas the 
second model includes the estimated effects of Announcements 1 and 2 on Arlington property 
values. 
  In each case the vast majority of the parameter estimates are insignificant. However, 
those precincts with a large proportion of older residents tended to vote against TransitTax2 and 
in favor of electing Robert Cluck mayor of Arlington more so than in other precincts, ceteris 
paribus. None of the property-related variables are statistically significant, including the 
percentage of the precinct’s population that was a homeowner.    25 
  The small sample size calls into question the large number of parameters estimated in the 
full model of Tables 7a.  The insignificant results may reflect true insignificance or weak power 
in the hypothesis tests because of the large number of degrees of freedom sacrificed. These 
models were therefore re-estimated after reducing the number of parameters to be estimated, 
specifically including only the estimated dollar effects of the stadium announcements. Again, our 
priors are that there should be no significant relationship between the price effects and the pre-
2004 vote results. Results are reported in Table 7b.  
  Only one price effect is statistically significant; that being for TransitTax1. Given that 
this is the only parameter out of 24 estimated parameters concerning property values in Table 7a 
and Table 7b, this significant parameter is within the bounds of convention and likely reflects a 
Type I error. 
  Overall, the models presented in Table 6 and Table 7 support the conclusion that our 
primary results reported in Table 5 are not spurious or that the results supporting the homevoter 
hypothesis are being caused by some unmeasured influence on voter behavior. Given the direct 
test of the homevoter hypothesis undertaken here, we find support for the hypothesis despite the 
fact that the stadium proposal passed. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper adds  to and expands on a  relatively small  but g rowing  empirical literature 
investigating the homevoter hypothesis.  First, we incorporate capitalized house price effects 
from an uncertain future public good project in explaining local support for the public good 
project.  Second, we are able to identify specific events that arguably increased the likelihood 
that public good project would be undertaken, and can therefore test whether price effects under   26 
reduced uncertainty are more important in explaining  voting outcomes. Finally, given the 
specific location of the public good project we investigate, wealth and consumption effects can 
both vary with distance from the proposed public project’s location and we therefore incorporate 
spatial relationships in the analysis. 
This is the first paper investigating a large discrete public good project in the context of 
the homevoter hypothesis and also seems to be the first to provide a direct test of the hypothesis. 
Our empirical approach entails identifying specific events which increased the probability that a 
large public good project would be undertaken (with a subsequent increase in local sales and use 
taxes), and estimating the impact of these events on local residential property values. We then 
combine the estimated price effects and local demographics to explain precinct-level support for 
the public good project. Increases in house prices associated with an increasing probability that 
the public project will be undertaken are used as (noisy) signals that the market anticipates the 
project to offer a positive net marginal benefit. The homevoter hypothesis posits that positive 
(negative) noisy signals should correspond to increased (decreased) support for the proposed 
public-good project. 
We apply this methodology to the November 2004 referendum to build a stadium for the 
NFL’s Dallas Cowboys in Arlington, Texas.  At the time,  voters in Arlington approved an 
increase in local sales and user taxes to contribute up to $325 million to the construction costs of 
a new stadium. In the months before the election, two distinct events occurred that arguably 
increased the probability that the stadium proposal would be accepted: the announcement that the 
mayor was in discussion with the team concerning a new stadium and the announcement that the 
city council had approved a city-wide referendum concerning the stadium proposal. We 
accommodate temporal and spatial variation in the effect of the potential stadium project by   27 
allowing the impact of  these two announcements to vary  with distance from the proposed 
stadium site. We find that support for the stadium fell (increased) where property values fell 
(rose) after these two announcements, ceteris paribus. We also find that homeowners in general 
were less likely to support the stadium proposal.  
However, if average property values in Arlington fell during the months leading up to the 
stadium referendum, consistent with Dehring Depken and Ward [26], the referendum’s success 
would seem in violation of the homevoter hypothesis. One explanation is differences between the 
average homeowner and the median voter. The median voter might vote in the affirmative if 
other determinants rather than expected changes in property values are considered. For example, 
individuals who anticipated considerable personal consumption benefits from a new stadium, 
e.g., because they anticipated attending events in the new stadium, might have been more likely 
to turn out and to vote ‘yes.’  Further, those who anticipated considerably smaller costs from 
building the stadium, e.g., transient or more mobile residents, might have been more likely to 
vote in the affirmative, everything else equal. Finally, a relatively small net cost may not induce 
an abstainer to turn  out and vote  ‘no,’  and therefore the median voter might have differed 
considerably from the average homeowner in Arlington. 
Another explanation could be imperfect information in voting markets. Public officials 
may personally benefit from a project even if there are negative net benefits for the city as a 
whole and might therefore focus on the perceived or anticipated benefits of the stadium while 
deemphasizing the costs involved.  Indeed, Porter and Thomas [29] point out that city and team 
officials often  over-promote the anticipated public benefits of a proposed stadium project, 
including appeals to city pride and notoriety, increased economic activity from tourism, and the 
potential for hosting mega-events such as a Super Bowl or an NCAA Final Four.    28 
These public benefits  have proven  difficult to measure and identify;  most academic 
studies suggest the  public benefits  after  a stadium is built are considerably less than those 
predicted before a stadium is built. However, to the extent that voters do not completely dismiss 
these claims as mere ‘cheap talk,’ such claims might influence the median voter’s support for a 
stadium subsidy. Our results suggest that voters more susceptible to ‘cheap talk,’ and those with 
less experience with past similar projects, were more likely to support the stadium proposal. 
A related explanation also stems from imperfect information in voting markets. Voters 
with shorter time horizons and therefore less direct exposure to potential future tax increases are 
more likely to estimate larger personal benefits and smaller personal costs of a large discrete 
project such as stadium. T hese voters may support  the proposal  even  without  positive  net 
benefits. Our results are also consistent with this explanation. 
While reduced-form in nature, t he  homevoter hypothesis provides an intuitively 
appealing explanation for how (and why) homeowners vote on public-good proposals. When a 
large, discrete project funded with a considerable outlay of public money is debated, the outcome 
of a public referendum often hinges upon the public’s perception of the costs and benefits of the 
project. Our empirical results concerning the 2004 stadium referendum in Arlington, Texas, 
suggest that on the margin voters internalized market information concerning the expected net 
benefits of the stadium conveyed through changing property values associated with an increased 
likelihood that the stadium would be built.  
Consistent with the homevoter hypothesis, regardless of whether property values changed 
in a voting precinct  during the stadium debate,  those  precincts with a  greater proportion of 
homeowners showed less support for the stadium proposal. Moreover, providing more direct 
support for the homevoter hypothesis,  in precincts where property values fell during the   29 
Arlington stadium debate there was an additional reduction in support for the proposal. This 
suggests that price changes associated with the stadium debate were conveyed in some fashion 
and altered the expected net benefits of the stadium. Future research in the context of stadium 
referenda and the homevoter hypothesis would add to our empirical understanding of how 
homeowners support proposed large, discrete, public good projects.    30 
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Table 1: Major Announcements Concerning Dallas Cowboys Stadium Site Search 
 
  Date   Description   
   
Announcement 1 *  July 17, 2004   Arlington’s mayor announces he has been in secret 
negotiations with the team about building a new publicly 
subsidized stadium near the existing baseball stadium in 
Arlington.   
   
Announcement 2 *  August 17, 2004   Arlington’s city council approves a stadium ballot 
initiative for the November 2004 general election. The 
ballot initiative asks voters to approve up to $325 million 
towards land acquisition and construction costs for a new 
stadium located near the existing baseball stadium in 
Arlington. The ballot initiative also includes a one half 
cent sales tax in Arlington as well as additional hotel and 
car rental taxes.   
   
Announcement 3   November 3, 2004   Arlington voters approve ballot initiative on November 3, 
2004, and the additional taxes are instituted on April 1, 
2005.   
* Pertinent to this study in so much as these announcements increased the likelihood of a stadium 
being built in Arlington and might have influenced property values before the referendum. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Arlington House Sales  
Variable   Description  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
PRICE  Sales price  132,437  63,133   23,800  900,000 
SQFT  Square footage   1943    675         670        5596 
BATHS  Number of bathrooms    2.26    .67          1           6 
AGE  House age (years)   22.69    15.68          0          77 
ACRES  Lot size in acres  .215  .142  .138  3.07 
POOL  Pool on property (1=Yes)   .14    .35          0           1 
PARK  Number of covered parking spaces   1.78    .66          0           6 
STORIES  Number of stories   1.21    .43         0           3 
OCCUPO  Owner occupied (1=Yes)   .45    .50          0           1 
OCCUPV  Vacant (1=Yes)   .37    .48          0           1 
TAKSEA 
Percentage of third grade students that 
scored acceptable on Texas Assessment of 
Knowledge Skills test 
 70.78    14.34         23          94 
TAKSEC 
Percentage of third grade students that 
scored commendable on Texas Assessment 
of Knowledge Skills test 
 14.89    7.49          1          30 
12-DSTAD 
12 - Distance from the proposed stadium 
site in Arlington in miles 
 8.08    2.62  2.08    12.44 
DISTFTWORTH 
Distance from Anon Carter Stadium at 
Texas Christian University (Fort Worth 
CBD) 
 14.18    2.36  8.43       18.26 
Notes: Data obtained from the Dallas-Fort Worth Multiple Listing Service. Sample reflects 2,241 single family detached property 
sales in Arlington that transacted through the Multiple Listing Service between January and December 2004. Distance from the 
proposed stadium site in Arlington and Anon Carter Stadium at Texas Christian University reflects the Great Circle distance. 
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Table 3: Housing Price Regression Results 
 
Variable  Parameter Estimate  Variable  Parameter Estimate 
AGE  -0.012***  (1-DSTAD)  -0.157* 
  (0.001)     (0.086) 
AGE2  6.5e-05***  (1-DSTAD)xANN1  0.223 
  (0.000)    (0.199) 
SQFT  2.969e-04***  (1-DSTAD)xANN2  -0.290 
  (0.000)    (0.218) 
LNACRES  0.156***  (1-DSTAD)xANN3  -0.542** 
  (0.013)    (0.245) 
POOL  0.093***  (2-DSTAD)  -0.092* 
  (0.010)    (0.052) 
BATHS  0.056***  (2-DSTAD)xANN1  -0.096 
  (0.009)    (0.109) 
PARK  0.028***  (2-DSTAD)xANN2  0.169 
  (0.006)    (0.119) 
STORIES  -0.059***  (2-DSTAD)xANN3  -0.028 
  (0.010)    (0.122) 
OCCUPO  0.057***  (3-DSTAD)  0.003 
  (0.009)    (0.033) 
OCCUPV  -0.034***  (3-DSTAD)xANN1  0.027 
  (0.010)    (0.048) 
TAKSEA  -0.001***  (3-DSTAD)xANN2  -0.089* 
  (0.000)    (0.053) 
TAKSEC  0.006***  (3-DSTAD)xANN3  0.099* 
  (0.001)    (0.054) 
DISTFW  -0.012***  Constant  11.474*** 
  (0.004)    (0.093) 
12-DSTAD  0.022***     
  (0.007)     
(12-DSTAD)xANN1  0.000     
  (0.000)     
(12-DSTAD)xANN2  0.004  Observations  2,241 
  (0.003)  R-squared  0.85 
(12-DSTAD)xANN3  0.002  F-statistic  186.31*** 
  (0.005)  H0: Fixed Effects Equal  13.724*** 
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of house price. Month dummy variables are not shown. A 
GLS estimator is employed that allows for heteroskedasticity by zipcode. Variables defined in Tables 1 and 2. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   36 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Arlington Voting Precincts 
 
Variable   Description  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
PCTYES  Percent voting 'YES' on the stadium proposal  56.71  8.93  43.37  100.00 
TURNOUT
 a  Percent of registered voters who voted on Cowboys stadium proposal  61.67  14.40  0.00  83.00 
PCTINOTHST95  Percent living in a different state in 1995  10.28  5.44  1.10  23.60 
PCTOVER65  Percent over 65  6.74  4.55  1.50  23.90 
INCOME  Median household income (in thousands)  54.56  18.39  19.30  104.69 
UNEMPLOYMENT Unemployment rate  3.05  1.37  0.60  6.20 
PCTWHITE  Percent white  63.85  18.91  9.00  90.00 
PCTOWNHOME  Percent Homeowners  61.17  28.84  4.10  95.70 
DOLLARANN1  Average price effect after Announcement 1 (thousands)  0.71  1.07  -3.60  4.64 
NOSALES1  No properties sold between Announcement 1 and Announcement 2  0.34  0.47  0  1 
DOLLARANN2  Average price effect after Announcement 2 (thousands)  0.66  1.97  -4.27  8.78 
NOSALES2  No properties sold between Announcement 2 and Announcement 3  0.22  0.41  0  1 
TransitTax1
b  May 2002 proposal for mass transit  43.28  5.72  32.08  59.64 
TransitTax2
 b  Feb 2003 proposal for mass transit and street maintenance  42.26  7.52  29.20  60.83 
TransitTax3
 b  Nov 2003 proposal for street maintenance  77.36  5.34  66.22  86.61 
Mayor
 b  Nov 2002 Mayoral election of Robert Cluck  53.27  7.52  41.26  68.94 
Observations  113         
Notes: Percentage voting yes includes early and day of election voting returns. Vote data obtained from the Arlington City 
Clerk’s office. Demographic data obtained from U.S. Census. 
a Based on 96 observations for which the total number of registered 
voters is available.
 b
 Based on election returns from 24 special polling locations within the city of Arlington. 
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Table 5: Support for the Cowboys Stadium Proposal (Dependent variable: Percent Voting Yes) 
   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
COEFFICIENT  PERYES  PERYES  PERYES  PERYES  PERYES  PERYES  PERYES 
               
PCTINOTHSTATE  0.483**  0.417*  0.429*  0.415*  0.442*  0.436*  0.431* 
  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.24)  (0.23)  (0.23) 
PCTOVER65  -0.0979  -0.123  0.0492  -0.0217  0.0718  0.238  0.208 
  (0.28)  (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.27) 
INCOME  0.155*  0.181**  0.148*  0.157**  0.188**  0.174**  0.179** 
  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.077)  (0.078)  (0.082)  (0.077)  (0.080) 
UNEMP  0.111  0.231  -0.404  -0.254  0.242  -0.253  -0.186 
  (0.78)  (0.81)  (0.73)  (0.77)  (0.81)  (0.75)  (0.79) 
PCTWHITE  -0.00200  -0.0184  -0.0457  -0.0364  -0.0524  -0.0897  -0.0862 
  (0.073)  (0.075)  (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.072)  (0.069)  (0.070) 
DIST  -0.361  -0.437  -0.623**  -0.670**       
  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.28)       
PCTOWNHOUSE  -0.0588  -0.0377  -0.0410  -0.0445  -0.0821*  -0.0981**  -0.104** 
  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.048) 
NOSALES1    4.690**    -1.243  4.408**    -1.273 
    (2.05)    (2.61)  (2.06)    (2.67) 
DOLLARANN1    1.143    0.627  0.767    0.277 
    (0.89)    (0.87)  (0.87)    (0.88) 
NOSALES2      7.150***  8.553***    7.056***  8.229*** 
      (1.90)  (2.67)    (1.94)  (2.73) 
DOLLARANN2      1.225**  1.162**    0.793*  0.755 
      (0.49)  (0.50)    (0.46)  (0.48) 
Constant  50.05***  47.06***  52.86***  52.21***  47.01***  51.52***  51.47*** 
  (7.03)  (7.19)  (6.55)  (6.93)  (7.24)  (6.65)  (7.08) 
Observations  113  113  113  113  113  113  113 
R-squared  0.21  0.25  0.34  0.34  0.23  0.30  0.31 
Notes: Dependent variable is the percent of total votes cast in favor of the Cowboys stadium referendum. 
Variables as defined in Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Voter Turnout as a Robustness Check 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
COEFFICIENT  TURNOUT  TURNOUT  TURNOUT  TURNOUT 
         
PCTINOTHSTATE  0.0236  0.0691  0.102  0.0967 
  (0.31)  (0.30)  (0.28)  (0.29) 
PCTOVER65  0.594*  0.485  0.334  0.316 
  (0.31)  (0.31)  (0.30)  (0.31) 
INCOME  0.401***  0.381***  0.387***  0.390*** 
  (0.096)  (0.094)  (0.087)  (0.090) 
UNEMP  -0.172  -0.208  0.199  0.221 
  (0.99)  (1.00)  (0.91)  (0.96) 
PCTWHITE  0.159*  0.185**  0.211***  0.212*** 
  (0.085)  (0.083)  (0.078)  (0.079) 
PCTOWNHOUSE  0.0384  0.00105  0.0364  0.0338 
  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.056)  (0.059) 
NOSALES1    -6.781***    -0.378 
    (2.56)    (3.01) 
DOLLARANN1    -0.344    0.150 
    (1.02)    (0.99) 
NOSALES2      -11.60***  -11.23*** 
      (2.54)  (3.27) 
DOLLARANN2      -0.814  -0.837 
      (0.60)  (0.63) 
Constant  23.09**  27.55***  22.91**  22.94** 
  (9.67)  (9.78)  (8.77)  (9.33) 
Observations  93  93  93  93 
R-squared  0.62  0.65  0.70  0.70 
Notes: Dependent variable is the percent of eligible voters who participated in the 
Cowboys stadium referendum. Variables as defined in Table 4. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7a: Previous Special Elections in Arlington as a Robustness Check 
   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
COEFFICIENT  TransitTax1  TransitTax1  TransitTax2  TransitTax2  TransitTax3  TransitTax3  Mayor  Mayor 
                 
PCTOVER65  -0.236  -0.481  -0.646*  -1.002**  0.360  0.473  1.012***  0.950** 
  (0.25)  (0.29)  (0.33)  (0.39)  (0.23)  (0.29)  (0.28)  (0.34) 
INCOME  -0.0731  0.0537  -0.0959  -0.00626  0.161  -0.0372  0.197  0.0963 
  (0.12)  (0.18)  (0.15)  (0.24)  (0.11)  (0.18)  (0.13)  (0.21) 
PCTOWNHOME  -0.0207  -0.0256  0.0678  0.106  -0.0956  -0.0748  -0.110  -0.0788 
  (0.067)  (0.074)  (0.087)  (0.10)  (0.062)  (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.087) 
NOSALES1    -1.512    4.572    0.278    0.574 
    (4.91)    (6.66)    (4.87)    (5.77) 
DOLLARANN1    1.257    2.913    1.645    2.364 
    (2.28)    (3.09)    (2.26)    (2.68) 
NOSALES2    -2.739    -5.427    7.057    5.390 
    (5.79)    (7.86)    (5.75)    (6.81) 
DOLLARANN2    -1.689    -2.253    1.615    -0.127 
    (1.33)    (1.81)    (1.32)    (1.57) 
Constant  50.04***  46.94***  47.84***  42.25***  72.05***  75.96***  42.33***  42.63*** 
  (4.64)  (5.71)  (6.02)  (7.76)  (4.30)  (5.67)  (5.08)  (6.71) 
Observations  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24 
R-squared  0.14  0.35  0.16  0.30  0.16  0.26  0.41  0.48 
Notes: Dependent variable is percent voting in favor of a public-good proposal in Arlington, TX, and the percent voting in favor of 
Mayoral candidate Robert Cluck. Variables as defined in Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                 
 
Table 7b: Previous Special Elections in Arlington as a Robustness Check 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
COEFFICIENT  TransitTax1  TransitTax1  TransitTax2  TransitTax2  TransitTax3  TransitTax3  Mayor  Mayor 
                 
PCTOVER65  -0.236  -0.469*  -0.646*  -0.887**  0.360  0.398  1.012***  0.898*** 
  (0.25)  (0.26)  (0.33)  (0.35)  (0.23)  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.31) 
INCOME  -0.0731  -0.0493  -0.0959  -0.0492  0.161  0.151  0.197  0.248 
  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
PCTOWNHOME  -0.0207  -0.00504  0.0678  0.0855  -0.0956  -0.0985  -0.110  -0.0999 
  (0.067)  (0.063)  (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.062)  (0.066)  (0.073)  (0.075) 
DOLLARANN1    2.631*    2.391    -0.345    0.689 
    (1.33)    (1.80)    (1.38)    (1.58) 
DOLLARANN2    -1.091    -1.486    0.273    -1.172 
    (0.88)    (1.19)    (0.91)    (1.05) 
Constant  50.04***  48.18***  47.84***  45.15***  72.05***  72.56***  42.33***  40.05*** 
  (4.64)  (4.69)  (6.02)  (6.36)  (4.30)  (4.87)  (5.08)  (5.57) 
Observations  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24 
R-squared  0.14  0.32  0.16  0.28  0.16  0.16  0.41  0.45 
Notes: Dependent variable is percent voting in favor of a public-good proposal in Arlington, TX, and the percent voting in favor of 
Mayoral candidate Robert Cluck. Variables as defined in Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The intra city-analysis reveals that the proposed stadium  was in a localized value crater. 
There are no significant house price effects from announcement 1. Following announcement 
2, house prices decrease by 8.5% per mile with each mile closer to the stadium for houses 
within three miles of the stadium. Following the stadium vote, denoted Announcement 3, this 
price effect reverses between 1 and 3 miles from the stadium. However, with within 1 mile of 
the stadium, house prices again decrease with proximity to the stadium. Over the sample 
period, there is a 37% decrease in price for those properties on the edge of the stadium.   
 